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INSURANcE-AERoNAUTICS EXCEPrION CLAusE.-Plaintiff was
beneficiary under a policy insuring the life of a bombardier who was
killed in action while performing duties in a military airplane. The
defense invoked was a supplemental agreement in the nature of an
aeronautics exception clause: "Death as a result, directly or indirectly,
of service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft, except as a passenger on a licensed passenger aircraft piloted by a licensed passenger
pilot on a scheduled passenger air service regularly offered over an
established route... is a risk not assumed under this contract. .. "
Conditions concerning military service, in another clause, called for
indorsement on date of issue if such service be restricted; no such
indorsement was on the policy. The plaintiff invoked the incontestability provision. The policy called for additional indemnity provided
the death did not result from any act of war; no claim was made for
recovery under this clause. Held, flying, as referred to in the aeronautics exception clause, includes death while flying with stunt pilot,
or a sky writer, or private aviator-civilian flying, either business or
pleasure; and there being no effective military service exclusion
clause, "the defendant would have paid if the insured were killed in
a foxhole, on a landing beach, or lost at sea", or, if the insured were
killed in action in a military airplane. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted. Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 52 N. Y.
S. (2d) 290 (1944).
This decision is in accord with prior cases. Under similar circumstances, where insured died in a crash of a military airplane, the
policy carried a rider extending coverage to insureds who entered
military service. But the said policy also contained an exclusion
clause where death resulted from aerial flight if insured was not a
passenger in a licensed commercial airplane. The construction on
both clauses combined was that "not only aviators but sailors, infantrymen or any other members of the armed services" injured or killed
while on duty in a military airplane are covered by the contract.'
Where the death of a naval cadet was the result of an aerial flight of
duty, the aviation exclusion clause was read as intended merely to
exclude from coverage the risks attendant upon civil aeronautics2
training and flight, and not the distinctive risks of military service.
If military risks were to be excluded from coverage there would have
been a military risk exclusion clause which would have excepted death
from participation in military aviation and also the other many risks
of military service. And in still another case, where the policy contained an aeronautics exception clause (as to death resulting from
service, travel, or flight in any species of aircraft as a passenger or
otherwise) and there was no clause excluding war risks, the court
held for the beneficiary when the insured's death resulted from
1 Schifter v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of America, 50
N. Y. S. (2d) 376 (1944).
2 Green v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 144 F. (2d) 55 (1944).
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drowning after the plane was shot down and the life-boat machinegunned while the victim was still on the fuselage of the plane.3
M. K. D.
TAKING OF AUTOMOBILE BY CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF

AGE AS THEFT OF CAR WITHIN MEANING OF AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PoLIc.-The appellant brought an action on an automobile
insurance policy in which the coverage clause declared, "To pay for
any loss of or damage to the automobile, hereinafter called loss, except
loss sustained by collision of the automobile with another object or
by upset of the automobile or by collision of the automobile with a
vehicle to which it is attached. Breakage of glass and koss caused by
missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, explosion, earthquake, windstorm,
hail, water, flood, vandalism, riot or civil commotion shall not be
deemed loss caused by collision or upset." The appellant parked his
automobile on a hill facing downward, with the right front wheel
turned at an angle against the curb, the handbrake on, the gears engaged, the ignition locked, and the keys thereto in his personal possession and the car door unlocked. Without his knowledge or consent and in his absence a three and one-half year old child entered the
car and caused it to start down the hill. The car rolled with the child
in it, until it was stopped and damaged by colliding with another automobile which was parked at a curb. Held, reversed. The intentional
appropriation of property, to a use inconsistent with the property
rights of the person from whom it is taken, is theft within the neaw;ing of an insurance policy. Any unusual destruction wrought it the
doing of a wrongful act is vandalism. In all cases of loss, the loss
will be attributed to the proximate, not to the remote cause. Unkelsbee v. Homestead Insurance Co., 41 A. (2d) 168 (1945).
Two questions were presented on this appeal: Was the loss
attributable to theft or vandalism? Or, if not, was the loss caused
by collision? The court first considered the question of theft. In
support thereof it said that theft within the meaning of an insurance
policy did not require that an intention be shown either to deprive
the owner of the value of the property or to permanently deprive him
of the use of the property but merely the intentional appropriation of
property to a use inconsistent with the property rights of the person
from whom it is taken.' With reference to the conclusive presumption of the common law which is carried into our jurisprudence, that
a child under seven years of age is incapable of forming a criminal
Bull v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 141 F. (2d) 456 (1944).
' Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 73 App. D. C. 161, 117
F. (2d) 774, 776 (1941). Contra: Home Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Trammel,
3

230 Ala. 278, 160 So. 897 (1935) ; Fidelity and Guaranty Fire Corp. v. Ratterman, 262 Ky. 350, 90 S. W. (2d) 679 (1936); Kovero v. Hudson Insurance

Co. of N. Y., 192 Minn. 10, 255 N. W. 93 (1934).

